Federalist paper 51

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed within our reach.Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark.Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence.The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than any of the preceding.From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States.If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage.And in every other nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side.

For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time.The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have been so industriously leveled.Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America.All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it.But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments.

Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all.What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and collect taxes.Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship.But the same process will lead to the same result, in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution.It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much.But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy.

We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States.The first is, that the convention must have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential influence of party animosities the disease most incident to deliberative bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings.The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction.Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war.Unless the exclusion be perpetual, there will be no pretense to infer the first advantage.Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them.

The want of a guaranty, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.

The Federalist Papers (#10, #51, #78) Lecture & Activity

The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years.It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder.If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom every thing depends in such bodies.

Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former.It will be in most cases nothing more than an exchange of State for national officers.And as, on the other hand, the wants of the government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with its respectability or its security.In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease.The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large.As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it.

What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS.Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on the other.Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear.From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace.The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code.The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies--one consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States.

Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of them shall he receive his orders.The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people in their popular assemblies.The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government.Other combinations, resulting from a difference of local position and policy, must have created additional difficulties.